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A Theory of Urban Housing Markets
and Spatial Structure
Inthis and the next chapter, we develop an analytic framework for the
examination of urban housing markets, the residential decisions of urban
households, and the determinants of urban spatial structures. This
framework is solidly in the tradition of earlier theoretical analyses. In the
manner of traditional urban economic theory, we postUlate that the
residential-location and housing-consumption decisions of urban house-
holds are based on a utility-maximizing calculus in whioh households
attempt to maximize their real incomes.
The way in which these housing- and transportation-èost tradeoffs
are represented in the revised theory, however, differs significantly from
the traditional analyses.
Traditi6nal theories are concerned almost exclusively with the
housing and location decisions of Central Business District (CBD) work-
ers. Yet the overwhelming majority of workers in the United States
metropolitan areas are employed at locations other than the CBD, and
this fraction is rapidly increasing. Because they postulate a single work-
place, traditional theories do not consider the effect of specific work-
place location on the housing and locational choices of households. In
our revised theory, in contrast, workplace location assumes a central
position in predicting both the residential-location and housing-con-
sumption decisions of urban households.
Our view of urban housing markets deviates from traditional theo-
ries in other important respects as well. Perhaps the most significant
difference is our abandonment of the long-run equilibrium framework
employed in traditional theories. Although it 'is a powerful theoretical
simplification, the long-run equilibrium assumption, which requires a full
adjustment of the nonresidential and residential capital stocks in
response to any change in technology, incomes, or preferences, is
widely at variance with reality.
What we term the "traditional theories" are derived largely from
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von Thunen's seminal theoretical analysis of the relationships between
site rentals and the location of economic activity in an agrarian society
characterized by a single marketplace (or port from which goods are
exported).' The best known and most highly developed of these tradi-
tional theories are by William Alonso and Richard Muth.2 Although
the authors of traditional theories are careful to include certain disclaim-
ers and caveats, there is little doubt that their theories are considered
as serious explanations of the residential-location decisions of urban
households, the spatial pattern of housing densities in urban areas, and
the pattern of urban housing prices.
Traditional theories employ a more or less common set of assump-
tions in deriving their conclusions about urban housing markets. They
typically assume that the city has a single workplace, at which all
productive activity is located. In addition, they assume that the city is
located on a featureless plain, that transportation costs are proportional
to distance, and that all land used to produce housing is identical.
Traditional theories further assume that "housing" is a single good
which enters as a single argument in households' preference functions
along with other goods (and, in some models, transportation time).
Households choose an amount of housing and a location (distance from
the single workplace) to maximize their utilities subject to a budget
constraint that includes the cost of housing, the costs of the work trip to
the central place, and the costs of other goods.
Traditional theories, moreover, assume that the housing good is
produced by perfectly competitive suppliers who combine two inputs,
land and "nonland," to maximize profits at given factor prices. In
addition, they assume that the price of "nonland" inputs is constant
throughout the city and that the size of the city is fixed (or that the
opportunity cost of land is fixed and known). Finally and most critically,
traditional theories assume that the market is in long-run equilibrium.3
1John Heinrich von Thunen, Der Isolirt Staat in Iieziehung aufNationakikonomie
und Landwirtschaft, 1828.
2For example: William Alonso, Location and Land Use (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1964); John F. Kain, "The Journey-to-Work as a Determinant of Residential
Location," Papers and Proceedings of the Regional Science Association 9(1962): 137—61;
Edwin S. Mills, "An Aggregative Model of Resource Allocation in a Metropolitan Area,"
Am&jcan Economic Ret'iew, 57 (May 1967): 197—211; Richard Muth, Cities and Housing
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Lowdon Wingo, Jr., Transportation and
Urban Land (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, Inc., 1961).
3This discussion is a more faithful description of Muth's treatment of these questions
than Alonso's, since Alonso obtains most of the same results by postulating a household
preference for residential space. In Muth's theory, in contrast, variations in residential
density are unrelated to preferences and instead are derived from input substitution by
housing suppliers. -A Theory of Urban Housing Markets and Spatial Structure 11
Under these assumptions, it can be shown that the competition for
central locations will bid up the price of sites located closer to the single
workplace. Since more centrally located land is relatively more expen-
sive than land located further from the center, housing suppliers will use
less land per unit of housing output at more central locations to produce
the homogeneous good "housing." The prices of "nonland" inputs are
assumed to be constant throughout the city and an all-round convex
production function is assumed, typically Cobb-Douglas.
Using these assumptions, traditional theories obtain the result that
the price of land declines with distance from the central workplace and
that it declines at a diminishing rate. Further, these theories conclude
that the gradient of land prices is steeper than the gradient of housing
prices, as long as the elasticity of substitution between land and "non-
land" in the production function for housing is not zero.
Given these equilibrium conditions for the housing market as a
whole and the spatial pattern of housing prices, traditional theories imply
that households of the same income will be indifferent among all residen-
tial locations in the city. At each distance .rom the single workplace, the
incremental savings in housing expenditures associated with an increase
in distance (evaluated at the household's optimum consumption of
housing) will be exactly offset by the incremental transportation costs to
the city center. Finally, if appropriate assumptions are made about the
income elasticity of demand for housing and about the income elasticity
of marginal transportation costs, it can be shown that higher-income
persons will live further from the central workplace.
Casual empiricism, as well as more sophisticated quantitative analy-
sis, indicates that on the average, housing prices and residential densities
tend to decline with distance from the center of American cities and that,
on the average, higher-income households live further from downtown.
These aggregate empirical regularities are often cited as confirmation of
the traditional theories. Still, it should be emphasized that these tests
have little power to discriminate among alternative explanations of these
phenomena and that these same empirical regularities are consistent
with theories of urban spatial structure that employ radically different
assumptions
Ourown evaluation of these traditional theories leads us to question
their usefulness as explanations of the structure and behavior of urban
housing markets and of the housing choices of urban households.
Although their elegance and simplicity have strong appeal, we find their
4See, for example,David Harrison and JohnF. Kain, "CumulativeUrban Growth
andUrban Density Functions," Urban Fconomics 1, no. 1 (January 1974): 48—60; and
John M. Quigley, "Residential Location With Multiple Workplaces and a Heterogeneous
Housing Stock" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1972).12 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
underlying assumptions and theoretical structure more appropriate to
the rural society of von Thünen's day than to modern urban areas.
The analytical framework developed in this chapter retains the
central behavioral relation used in these traditional theories—the oppor-
tunity available to urban households to substitute between transport
costs and location rents. The way in which these housing and transport
costs tradeoffs are represented in our revised theory differs significantly
from their representation in traditional theories. For example, traditional
theories are concerned almost exclusively with the housing and location
decisions of Central Business District (CBD) workers. Yet the over-
whelming majority of workers in the United States metropolitan areas
are employed at locations other than the CBD; in fact, in 1970 more than
half of all jobs in metropolitan areas were located outside the central
cities, and this fraction is rapidly increasing. Because they postulate a
single workplace, traditional theories do not consider the effect of
specific workplace location on the housing and locational choices of
households. In our revised theory, in contrast, workplace location
assumes a centralposition in predicting both the residential-location and
housing-consumption decisions of urban households.
Our view of urban housing markets deviates from traditional theo-
ries in other important respects as well. Perhaps the most significant
difference is our abandonment of the long-run equilibrium framework
employed in traditional theories. Although it is a powerful theoretical
simplification, the long-run equilibrium assumption, which requires a full
adjustment of the nonresidential and residential capital stocks in
response to any change in technology, incomes, or preferences, is
widely at variance with reality.
Abandoning the long-run equilibrium assumption makes it possible,
indeed imperative, to address directly the implications of the heteroge-
neity and durability of the housing stock and of the irregular spatial
distribution of specific housing capital for the consumption of housing by
various types of households, for the residential-location decisions of
these households, and for spatial location of specific kinds of housing
investment.
Our approach has still another advantage. It enables us to consider
explicitly the effect on housing markets of the nonmarket production of a
number of important housing attributes, such as the quality of local
government services and the physical characteristics, amenity, and
socioeconomic composition of the neighborhood. Finally, within this
theoretical framework, we are able to analyze many of the effects of
racial discrimination, which is clearly the most serious market imperfec-
tion affecting urban housing markets. Our revised theory, then, differs
from traditional theories in three major respects. These are: (1) emphasis
on the substantial effect of alternative workplace locations on the hous-A Theory of Urban Housing Markets and Spatial Structure 13
ing and location decisions of urban households; (2) abandonment of the
confining long-run equilibrium assumption; and (3) explicit attention to
the role of various kinds of externalities and interdependence, particu-
laxly racial discrimination. We now turn to a fuller discussion of the
theoretical implications of each of these differences in perspective,
beginning with the long-run equilibrium assumption.
THENATURE OF HOUSING OUTPUT
Thelong-run equilibrium assumption, used in traditional theories,
assumes that all housing inputs except land are variable and therefore
implies that geographic variations in housing prices within urban areas
depend only on differences in land prices. This assumption, moreover,
permits the theorist to ignore the effects of durable nonresidential and
residential capital stocks and to define housing output as a single-valued,
homogeneous good, "housing services," measured by a household's
total expenditure for
This approach suffers from a number of serious conceptual difficul-
ties. First, differences in housing expenditures can reflect either differ-
ences in quantity or differences in price. This fact has been recognized
by previous authors, and the most careful studies attempt to use price
indexes to correct for price changes. In every instance, however, the
indexes used fail to incorporate the effects of price changes attributable
to neighborhood change, to spatially distributed quasi rents, or even to
raw land prices. For example, Richard Muth's study of housing demand
deflates expenditures by the Boeckh construction-cost index for single-
family units. However, the Boeckh index represents only changes in the
prices of labor and materials used to construct a new dwelling unit.6
De Leeuw, in his studies of rental housing, uses BLS surveys of the
monthly rent for a standard bundle of housing services to measure inter-
city variations in the price of rental housing.7 The BLS surveys are
designed to obtain rents for comparable dwelling units in different cities
and, to some degree, they define the price of standard housing-services
bundles. The BLS procedures explicitly consider only a few of the many
5The mostexplicit statementof this approach is contained in Edgar 0. Olsen, "A
Competitive Theory of the Housing Market," American Economic Review 59, no. 4 (Sept.
1969): 612—21.
6Richard Muth, "The Demand for Nonfarm Housing," in The Demand for Durable
Goods,A.Harberger, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); Frank de Leeuw,
"TheDemand for Housing: AReview of Cross-Section Evidence,"Review of Economics
and Statistics 53,no. 1 (Feb. 1971): 1—11.
7Frank de Leeuw and Nkanta F. Ekanem, "The Supply of Rental Housing,"
American Economic Review 61, no. 5 (Dec. 1971): 806—17; and de Leeuw, "Demand for
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dimensions of the bundle of residential services, however, and as a
result, they fail to provide uniform definitions of rental housing among
cities. As a result, we suspect that the rental price measures used by de
Leeuw in his studies embody both price and quantity variation among
cities. If our suspicions are correct, this would provide an alternative
explanation for the positive relationship he obtains between SMSA
rent levels and SMSA incomes in his study of the supply of rental
housing and would imply that de Leeuw's principal conclusion—that the
supply of rental housing services is quite inelastic—is incorrect.
The use of housing expenditures to measure housing output has an
even more fundamental weakness, however. When households buy or
rent a residence, they simultaneously choose a large number of specific
and identifiable attributes. These include the number of rooms, a struc-
ture type, a neighborhood environment, a set of neighbors, a diverse
collection of public services, and a particularjourney to work. In princi-
ple, as Equation 2-1 illustrates, there is a market price associated with
each of these attributes.
(2-1) =P1+ P2+. .. +P,1
where H1 are the expenditures for the ith bundle of residential services,
(X1.,, X2.,,..., are the quantities of different attributes comprising
the ith bundle of residential services, and (P1, P2,...,P,,)are the unit
prices of these attributes.
Only limited consideration of Equation 2-1 is needed to identify the
serious problems inherent in relying on housing expenditures to measure
housing output. Any number of combinations of attributes and quantities
may be obtained for the same total outlay. Yet bundles with the same
cost may be considered completely different by both demanders and
suppliers of housing. Indeed, both groups may regard them as much less
similar than other bundles that differ substantially in price. Price changes
only compound the problem. Without identifying the individual attri-
butes, their quantities, and their prices, itis virtually impossible to
interpret changes in housing expendi. jres.
The apparent solution to these problems is clear. All that is required
is to obtain and analyze information on the prices and quantities of the
attributes included in each bundle. In spite of the obvious advantages of
this approach and its beguiling simplicity, little progress has been made
in its empirical implementation, and even less in considering the theoret-
ical implications of this broader view of housing services.
There are several reasons why empirical and theoretical studies of
the housing market have not viewed housing services in this way. Major
theoretical and empirical difficulties arise from the fact that the individ-
ual attributes (X1, X2,..., cannot be purchased individually.
Instead, they must be purchased as part of an entire bundle of residentialA Theory of Urban Housing Markets and Spatial Structure 15
services. As a result, the individual prices (Ps, P2,..., are never
observed directly; they must be imputed from the differences in the cost
of "otherwise identical" bundles.
An analogy to studies of the demand for food may help clarify the
special characteristics of housing markets. Empirical analyses of the
demand for foodstuffs are probably more detailed and more highly
developed than any other area of applied econometrics. These studies
have examined household consumption of foods at various levels of
aggregation; for example, all foods, meats, and beef. In each case, the
aggregate prices and quantities are built up from microeconomic data on
price and quantity. Why have similar procedures not been followed in
housing markets, where the bundle of residential services is at least as
heterogeneous as the market basket of consumer food purchases?
The explanation is to be found in the differences in the manner in
which foods and housing are produced, marketed, and consumed. When
shoppers go to the supermarket, each constructs his own market basket
by combining quantities of individual types of food products in any way
he wishes. In choosing how much of each item to include, the household
compares the given price of that item to the given price of other items.
The ith household's weekly food consumption F, then is the simple sum
of the amounts spent for each item (price times quantity). This expres-
sion, illustrated by Equation 2-2, appears identical to the definition of
housing expenditures depicted by Equation 2-1:
(2-2) F1 =P1X1,+ P2X2, + ... +
The analogy breaks down at this point, however.
In supermarkets, the price of each item is clearly marked, and
shoppers may take as many or as few of each item as they like. Housing
consumers never directly observe the prices of individual attributes.
Therefore, to make the supermarket analogy comparable, we must
require shoppers to choose from among a finite number of grocery carts,
each filled with some combination of items and selling at a fixed price.
Equation 2-3 illustrates the supermarket problem, where F, is the
market price of the market basket purchased by the ith household, (X1,
X2, ..., X7Jare the amounts of each grocery item in the basket, and
the prices of individual items (F1,...,either are not known or are
not provided by the supermarket. We suggest that had the grocery
shopping problem been presented in this manner, it would have affected
the behavior of both consumers and econometricians studying the
demand for foodstuffs.
(2-3) F1 = ..., Xv,)
Under favorable circumstances, it may be possible for either shop-
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in either the hypothetical market basket or the bundle of residential
services. If there is a large enough variety of market baskets (bundles)
and if the suppliers have priced the attributes identically in all bundles, a
unique set of prices may be imputed. Unfortunately, these ideal circum-
stances do not exist in the housing market. As a consequence, the price
relationship is unlikely to be a simple additive one and, worse still, a
unique set of prices for housing attributes may not exist.
In addition, it is unclear how many attributes should be included in
the bundle of residential services or how they should be defined and
measured. The heterogeneity of dwelling units, structures, neighbor-
hoods, and other dimensions is so great that a large number of plausible
output definitions exist. Indeed, since one attribute of the bundle of
residential services is a specific location, no two bundles can be pre-
cisely alike. Clearly, if the concept is to be operationally useful, housing
bundles must include far fewer than the theoretically possible number of
dimensions. A principal objective of the analysis presented in subse-
quent chapters is to identify, define, measure, and price the "important"
dimensions of the bundle of residential services. Much of Chapter 4
deals with the problems of defining housing output and with the efforts to
develop workable definitions of individual housing attributes. Chapter 8
describes efforts to impute prices to individual housing attributes.
Beyond the problems of defining and measuring the bundle,
attempts to estimate attribute prices are hampered by the fact that many
of the possible X vectors are never produced. In addition, the durability
and the locational specificity of many dimensions of residential services
make the interpretation of the estimated attribute prices obtained in
subsequent chapters for heterogeneous stocks of residential capital and
neighborhood attributes somewhat unclear. Both kinds of housing attri-
butes have variable and uncertain lives. Because of these characteristics
of housing bundles, the imputed market values of housing attributes (P1,
P2,..., include quasi rents. Moreover, the market prices of many
housing attributes may be below their reproduction cost (supply price in
long-run equilibrium).
Although it is admittedly somewhat arbitrary, we treat location
differently from the remaining attributes. This convention permits us to
define a spatial quasi rent for each attribute or collection of attributes,
even those that are not being produced currently. The simple additive
relationship depicted by Equation 2-1, though certainly oversimplified,
can be extended to illustrate the concept of spatial quasi rents for
individual housing attributes, or for bundles of attributes. Specifically
the market value of each attribute in Equation 2-1 consists of two
components: (1) the production cost (long-run equilibrium price) of the
kth attribute, Pk,whichdoes not vary spatially, and (2) the spatial quasiA Theory of Urban Housing Markets and Spatial Structure 17
rent for the kth attribute at the ith location, rkl. Equation 2-4 depicts the
housing price at the ith location.
(2-4) H1 +X1, + (P2 + r2j X21 + .+ +
where
Pk=supplyprice of the kth attribute if it is currently being
produced or its market price at the least-cost location if it is
not currently produced;
=quasirent for the kth attribute at the ith location;
Xkf =quantityof the kth attribute at the ith location.
When a housing attribute is currentl.y being produced, the market
price of the housing attribute (pk +in Equation 2-4 has a straightfor-
ward interpretation, i.e., Pk is the unit cost of producing the attribute. At
those locations, where the attribute is being produced currently, the
market value of the attribute in the competitive stock must equal or
exceed the current cost of production. This inequality need not hold for
other locations, however. In particular, as we illustrate in the appendix
to this chapter, it is easy to imagine situations in which the market value
of the attribute would be less than the reproduction cost at locations
where the attribute is not being produced. At these locations, the quasi
rent,is negative. These negative quasi rents will arise in circum-
stances where there is a decline in demand for the attribute and the stock
cannot be profitably transformed.
For positive quasi rents to persist at a particular location or resi-
dence zone, there must be an effective supply constraint or spatial
difference in production cost. When the supply costs Pk do vary by
location, these spatial production-cost differences are capitalized as
quasi rents. This phenomenon can arise from obstructed land that raises
the effective land cost at particular locations or from the presence of
housing attributes that are not supplied by competitive firms.
It is also possible to make some statements about the maximum
values of positive quasi rents for individual attributes. In particular,
drawing on the analytical insight provided by monocentric theories of
residential location, it is clear that if housing attributes are produced
independently, differences in quasi rents for a particular attribute k
between any two zones i andj cannot exceed the difference in transport
costs between the two zones for the marginal consumer of that attribute,
(2-5) — —ti
whereis the capitalized transport (journey-to-work) cost associated
with location i.
Even the foregoing discussion is oversimplified. The production of18 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
housing attributes is often characterized by joint costs and, in practice, it
may be impossible to separate individual housi.ng-stock attributes and
their prices. In principle, this jointness can be recognized by introducing
interactions in attribute prices and quasi rents. Thus, Equation 2-4 can
be expanded to include joint-price effects between housing attributes /
and m, P17k, and joint quasi rents at location i,
(2-6) = (P1 + r11) X11 +... + + + (P12 + r121) +
X11X2, + + + + ..• +
+
Important interactions may be numerous, however, and, at the limit,
this procedure leads to the definition of discrete housing types defined
by specified levels of several attributes. These discrete types, defined by
particular levels of various attributes, are then considered to be homoge-
neous housing goods. At any location, the prices of these bundles can be
expressed in terms of two components: a constant supply price of the
housing bundle for the metropolitan area, anda spatial.quasi rent
Whilethis approach has obvious advantages, the number of housi.ng
types quickly becomes very large if many dimensions are considered. Of
course, itis not necessary to stratify the housing market by every
housing attribute. A combination of discrete and parametric variables
may be used in the analysis; that is, equations containing continuous
variables describing housing attributes of the form (2-1) can be esti-
mated for discrete categories of housing. This procedure permits a full
interaction between those variables included in the equation and the
housing attributes used to stratify the equation. Stratifications of this
kind are performed in Chapter 8 for (1) rental and owner-occupied
housing, (2) ghetto and nonghetto rental and owner-occupied properties,
and (3) room size categories for rental and owner-occupied properties
located outside the ghetto.
The best way of representing the complex and multidimensional
housing surface of housing prices is ultimately an empirical issue. Theo-
retical considerations may suggest where to look for significant depar-
tures from long-run equilibrium and where jointness in the production
and pricing of attributes is likely to occur. But, if useful descriptions of
metropolitan surfaces of housing prices are to be obtained, it will be
necessary both to develop large samples of price information and housing
characteristics and to carry out careful econometric estimates of alter-
native models.
Although we remain uncertain about how best to represent housing
prices in urban housing markets, one fact is clear from our research. The
result obtained from traditional models, i.e., a single location rent gra-
dient which declines with distance from the center, does not conformA Theory of Urban Housing Markets and Spatial Structure 19
well to reality. Instead, distinct and quite different rent surfaces exist for
the various housing attributes. Recent econometric studies of the San
Francisco-Oakland and Pittsburgh housing markets have obtained
empirical results that support this important conclusion.
Four studies—Mahion Straszheim's study of the San Francisco-
Oakland housing market, and separate studies of the Pittsburgh housing
market by Gregory K. Ingram, by John M. Quigley, and by William
Apgar and John F. Kain8—all reveal rather large spatial variations in the
prices of housing attributes. Moreover, these analyses indicate that the
price surfaces differ substantially for the various housing attributes
considered, a finding that directly contradicts the long-run equilibrium
assumption of traditional models.
Suggestion of the results obtained from these studies is provided by
Table 2-1, which includes summaries of attribute-price estimates
obtained by Straszheim. in his study of the housing choices of several
thousand San Francisco households. Straszheim obtained estimates of
the market prices of housing attributes for rental and owner-occupied
housing in the San Francisco-Oakland metropolitan area, using tech-
niques similar to those employed in Chapter 8 of this book. However, he
estimated equations of the form shown in Equation 2-1 for each of
seventy-three residence zones. This method allows the price of each
attribute included in the regressive equation, which in Straszheim's
study included number of rooms, structure age, lot size, and structure
condition, to differ for each residence zone.9
The first row in Table 2-1 gives the estimated price of a standard-
ized rental and owner-occupied unit near the CBD and in the suburbs.
Straszheim estimated that this standard unit would cost $57,150
adjacent to the San Francisco CBD but only $26,647 an hour's commut-
ing time from downtown. The standardized rental unit cost an estimated
$186 per month adjacent to the CBD and $122 per month in the suburbs
an hour distant from downtown.
Table 2-1 illustrates that there is substantial variation among the
price gradients for housing attributes. All attributes shown in Table 2-1
are more expensive downtown than in the suburbs—but the variation is
8Mahlon R. Straszheim, An Econometric Analysis of the Urban Housin.g Market
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975); Gregory K. Ingram, "A
Simulation Model of a Metropolitan Housing Market" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University,
1971); John M. Quigley, "The Influence of Workplaces and Housing Stocks upon Resi-
dential Choice; A Crude Test of the 'Gross Price' Hypothesis," paper presented at the
Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, December 28—30,
1972; William C. Apgar, Jr. and John F. Kain, "Neighborhood Attributes and the Resi-
dential Price Geography of Urban Areas," paper presented at the Winter Meetings of the
Econometric Society, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, December 28—30, 1972.
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TABLE2-1
Suburban—Central City Differences in Housing Prices in the San Francisco—




Price of standardized unit3 $57,150 $26,647$185.80$122.12
Incremental cost per room 4,515 2,723 28.45 10.62
Incremental savings on
standardized unit:
Structure age 1950—65 15,151 3,640 34.16 15.41
Structure age 1940—50 26,277 3,795 42.05 22.79
Structure age pre-1940 32,485 5,911 51.01 30.15
Lot size.2 acres 5,357 6,100 — —
Lot size =.3—.5acres —8,605 —3,354 — —
Lot size > .5 acres —30,505 —16,116 — —
Unsound condition —17,821 —14,251 38.38 —
SOURCE: Mahion R.Straszheim, An Econometric Analysis of the Urban Housing
Market (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975).
'Average for four zones located in Census Tracts BI—BlO, J1—J20 in downtown
San Francisco.
2Average for ten zones located .55— .65 hour commuting distance from CBD.
3Owner-occupied unit of 5.5 rooms, built since 1960, on .2— .3 acre lots in sound
condition. Renter-occupied unit of 4 rooms, built since 1960, in sound condition.
great. For example, for owner-occupied units, an additional room costs
$4,515 near the CBD and $2,723 in the suburbs. The price gradient for
structure age is much steeper: the figures in Table 2-1 indicate that a
household can expect to save $32,485 by purchasing a structure more
than 30 years old near the CBD; however, the savings from purchasing a
unit more than 30 years old in the suburbs are only $5,911. If traditional
theories are interpreted literally, the price of attributes such as additional
rooms or structure age—a proxy for quality features of the unit or its
condition—should he identical for every zone. Variations in price by lot
size are consistent with traditional theories, but not variations of the
kind reported by Straszheim.
HOUSINGPRODUCTION RELATIONSHIPS
Anexamination of the assumptions about the nature of housing
production relationships assumed by traditional theories and by our
revised theory of urban spatial structure may help clarify the distinctionA Theory of Urban. Housing Markets and Spatial Structure 21
between these two views of urban housing markets. Traditional theories
of urban spatial structure assume a housing production function, similar
to Equation 2-7, in which varying quantities of the homogeneous good,
housing (H), at location I (measured as distance from the central place)
may be produced by combining land and "nonland" factor inputs.'0
(2-7) H, C)
where
L,land input at distance i from central place;
C ="nonland"inputs.
Traditional theories distinguish between land and nonland factors of
production because they are concerned primarily with explaining varia-
tions in density, and because the price of nonland factors is assumed to
be identical at all locations, whereas the price of land declines with
distance from the central production center.
Land prices decline with distance from the center because of the
accessibility advantages of residential sites near the single workplace.
Since land is more expensive at central locations while nonland factors
have the same prices at all locations, housing suppliers use less land to
produce housing near the central location. In spite of these efforts to
conserve its use, some land must be used to produce housing (a Cobb-
Douglas production function is typically assumed). As a result, housing
costs are higher near the central location, but the gradient of housing
prices is less than the gradient of land prices. The higher cost of housing
near the center encourages those households who consume large
amounts of housing to commute farther. Housing consumption per
household then increases with distance from the center, even though
housing consumption per acre declines.
In contrast to the housing production function used in traditional
theories, our revised theory asserts that the heterogeneous bundles of
services sold in urban housing markets cannot be ordered uniquely along
a single dimension. Each individual can rank all possible or available
housing bundles, from those he prefers most to those that he prefers
least, or from those which cost the least to him to those which cost the
most to him, but it is impossible to aggregate these individual ordinal
rankings into a unique ordering of bundles. Housing bundles can still be
ranked cardinally by price, i.e., by monthly rent or market value, which
is the convention employed in traditional theories. These rankings,
however, are merely the current market value of bundles of heteroge-
neous attributes; they are not measures of the quantity of a homoge-
ñeous good. Rather than maintaining the fiction of a unidimensional
10For example, see Muth, Cities and Housing, Chap. 3.22 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
housing good, we contend that it is better to analyze housing in terms of
consumption bundles consisting of combinations of housing attributes.
Instead of the quantity of a single good, measured by price, we
describe housing output as a vector of housing attributes. Since housing
services are normally consumed in more or less closely related "bun-
dles" of individual attributes, due to the durability and lack of malleabil-
ity of the housing stock, it is convenient to discuss these bundles rather
than individual housing attributes. Equation 2-8 depicts a production
function that embodies this view of the hOusing market and acknowl-
edges the crucial, roles of existing structures and of housing attributes
that are not produced by competitive firms.
(2-8) H, =f C,
where
Si =sunkcapital (existing structures and parcels at the ith loca-
tion);
N, =neighborhoodattributes at the ith location.
Housing output H, is a vector of K attributes or, for convenience, a
composite housing bundle at residential location i. The first two inputs in
Equation 2-8, vacant land and nonland factors of production, are analo-
gous to those in the production function used in most classical theories
of urban spatial structure. The remaining inputs—sunk capital (existing
structures and their parcels) and neighborhood attributes—are location-
ally given to housing suppliers in the short and medium run.
The addition of capital stocks to the housing production function is
required by the abandonment of the long-run equilibrium assumption.
The inclusion of neighborhood attributes in the production function
simply acknowledges both the importance of various kinds ofinterdepen-
dence and the fact that many important housing attributes cannot be
produced by individual property owners and are not supplied by compet-
itive firms.1'
The production function depicted by Equation 2-8 represents sev-
eral production relationships that have distinctly different implications
for urban housing markets than those obtained from traditional models.
t1Some limited efforts have been made to include these market dimensions of the
housing bundle in theories of residential location, although not in the manner we propose
here. See Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of
Political Economy, 24, no. 64 (Oct. 1956): 416—24; Jerome Rothenberg, "Strategic Interac-
tion and Resource Allocation in Metropolitan Intergovernmental Relations," American
Economic Review 59, no, 2 (May 1969): 494—503; Bryan Ellickson, "Metropolitan Residen-
tial Location and the Local Public Sector" (Memorandum 137, Institute of Government
and Public Affairs, U.C.L.A., Jan. 1970).A Theory of Urban Housing Markets and Spatial Structure 23
For analytical purposes, it is useful to distinguish among several types of
production activities, or ways in which a particular housing bundle can
be produced.
First, neighborhood attributes differ from the remaining inputs in
Equation 2-8 in that they cannot be changed by the actions of individual
homeowners or housing investors. Some scope exists for residents and
property owners to modify the production and other decisions of local
governments through various forms of political action. Housing sup-
pliers and, to an even greater extent, homeowners devote considerable
time to these activities. (Greater efforts by homeowners are presumably
explained by the higher transactions and moving costs of homeowners,
the psychic values many households come to attach to particular neigh-
borhoods or communities, and the investment nature of these activities
by owner-occupants.) Still,itis unlikely that many homeowners or
housing investors make location or investment decisions in the expecta-
tion of obtaining major changes in government policies or of modifying
the socioeconomic composition of their neighborhoods in significant
ways.
While individual firms can do very little to modify neighborhood
characteristics within built-up areas, they have somewhat more scope
when they build new subdivisions on vacant land. Indeed to some
extent, the developer of a large subdivision can determine the character-
istics of his neighborhood at the time of its development, a consideration
that may explain the homogeneity of most large subdivisions and the
tendency to produce more high-quality than low-quality, housing through
new construction. But even large-scale subdividers have limited oppor-
tunities to produce neighborhood attributes. In particular, they are
constrained by the norms and resources of the communities where they
locate their subdivisions, and by the extent of the market for each kind of
neighborhood in each part of the metropolitan area.
Within each type of neighborhood, several physical production
possibilities exist. First, virtually any kind of housing bundle, consistent
with that neighborhood location, can be produced by combining vacant
land and various nonland factors of production. Moreover, since vacant
land can always be produced through the demolition of existing struc-
tures, any kind of structure can be produced iii this way. However, the
cost of acquiring and demolishing existing structures (including the
opportunity costs of existing structures and residential capital) makes
demolition relatively infrequent.
One common type of stock transformation involves only incremen-
tal changes or modifications and results in improvements to existing
structures and parcels that increase the desirability and market value of
the bundle by the full amount of the incremental expenditure. Stock24 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
transformations of this kind would include some kinds of redecoration,
increased annual outlays for services, or the simple addition of a room or
rooms that maintain the structural integrity of the unit. The essential
characteristic of this example is that the original structure is fully
utilized; something is merely added.
Other types of transformation involve the replacement of all or part
of a structure by new physical capital. At one extreme, this transforma-
tion occurs when an entire structure (or several structures) is demolished
and a new one is constructed. The combined outlays for the acquisition
of the original structure(s) or parcel(s) and for demolition constitute the
full cost of the vacant land created. As we have indicated previously,
existing residential structures are demolished and replaced by new
residential structures only infrequently. On the other hand, less extreme
transformations of this kind are commonplace. The replacement of old
kitchens or bathrooms, for example, may cost as much or more than
constructing new facilities of equal quality. These transformations often
involve the replacement of all fixtures, plumbing, and.wiring. The essen-
tial difference between incremental changes and replacement is the
significant demolition costs which must be borne before structural rear-
rangement may take place.
In the appendix to this chapter, we present some simple examples
of how these different types of production relationships may affect the
structure of housing prices and the spatial patterns of quasi rents for
bundles of housing services. The analysis considers the implications of
two polar types of structure transformations, using a simple housing-
market model which analyzes price determination and supply responses
for two types of residential structures (a "high-quality" and a "low-
quality" structure) that may be consumed in a central built-up area and
in a suburban area.
The examples illustrate that if heterogeneous and durable stocks
exist, the spatial pattern of quasi rents will depend on the nature of
structure transformation costs. The first example demonstrates that as
long as the cost of transforming housing from one bundle type to another
in the built-up central area is the same as the difference in production
cost at the noncentral (suburban) area, the price differences between
identical. units at the two locations wil.l reflect only accessibility differen-
tials. The second example demonstrates that if the transformation costs
exceed the difference in construction costs at the urban fringe (the
suburban location), market prices at the central location may diverge
from the long-run equilibrium prices.
In real-world housing markets, where there are large numbers of
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of significant transformation cost differentials among housing submar-
kets is sufficient to cause substantial departures from long-run equilib-
rium prices without causing households to move or housing suppliers to
transform the stock. This "equilibrium" may exist for long periods of
time, but its implications may be totally different from the implications
of the "equilibrium" analyzed by traditional theories.
HOUSINGDEMAND AND RESIDENTIAL LOCATION
Thedifficulty and cost of making many kinds of physical transfor-
mations of residential structures, the inability of individual firms and
households to change still other dimensions of housing bundles, and the
of many housing attributes have strong implications for
theories of housing demand and residential location.
There are at least two ways in which the demand for housing
bundles can be analyzed. First, households can be depicted as having
preferences for each housing attribute and for all other goods and
services. Then, household demand for each attribute can be derived
from these preferences, and from information on household income and
prices—the prices of individual housing attributes and of all other goods
and services. The bundle of housing consumed by each household thus
becomes the simple sum of the household's consumption of each indi-
vidual attribute. This view of the problem is convenient for statistical
analysis, and although we consider it deficient in important respects, we
employ it extensively in our analysis of the demand for both individual
attributes and groups of housing attributes.
The most serious difficulty with viewing the demand for housing
bundles as the simple sum of the demand for housing attributes is that
households seldom have the opportunity of buying individual attributes.
Instead, they usually must choose from among a large number of fixed
bundles. Often, they are able to modify these bundles by making addi-
tional expenditures, but the scope for changing bundle characteristics in
this way is definitely limited. Some types of changes are inordinately
expensive when compared with the cost of new construction, and many
important attributes cannot be produced by the actions of single housing
suppliers.
These aspects of housing production functions insure that many
types of bundles will seldom, perhaps never, be produced, and that the
price of many attributes will be jointly determined. For these reasons,
we believe it is more instructive to analyze housing markets in terms of
the demand for, supply of, and production of housing bundles, rather26 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
than employing either a single homogeneous good, housing, or housing
attributes.
Viewing housing demand as the demand for specific housing bun-
dles requires only slight modifications of traditional demand theory. The
choice among quantities of homogeneous goods on the basis of prefer-
ences and prices, subject to a budget constraint, implies that consumers
select goods in such a way that the satisfaction received from the last
dollar's worth of each good is the same. The notion of housing bundles
implies that each housing consumer chooses from a large number of
differently priced bundles the one housing bundle which maximizes his
real income. Corresponding to each possible binary choice is a different
level of satisfaction or real income. As the appendix reveals, the dis-
creteness of the housing choice implies that demand curves for housing
types are not continuous; this, however, leads to no serious departure
from traditional demand theory. The prices of housing bundles used in
our revised theory, however, differ in an important respect from those
employed in traditional demand theory and in traditional theories of
urban spatial structure. The existence of spatial quasi rents in urban
housing markets means that the price of a given housing bundle (defined
to be homogeneous in all respects except location) may differ at each
location. The spatial pattern of quasi rents can be expected to be quite
complex, with the result that the ratios of the relative prices of housing
bundles can be expected to vary considerably from one part of an urban
area to another.
In addition, workers employed at different workplaces will view
these prices quite differently. In traditional models, all workers are
assumed to be employed at the same workplace; and as a result, they
have the same view of alternative bundles and locations.'2 Data on the
location of employment in metropolitan areas clearly demonstrates the
inappropriateness of this monocentric assumption. It is rare that as much
as 10 percent of all employment is located in the core, or Central
Business District; and central cities often contain less than half of all
metropolitan employment. In 1963, 52percentof all manufacturing
12The authors of these theoriesacknowledgethe lack of realism of thisassumption,
and all attempt to incorporate some noncentral employment into their models. The most
common approach is to define a category of local workers, who presumably provide
neighborhood services. The inclusion of these local workers in the models cannot be
regarded as a meaningful departure from the monocentric assumption. Their behavior is
never considered in any but the most trivial way, and their inclusion has little or no effect
on the solutions obtained from the theories. For example, see Muth, CitiesandHousing,
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employment and 29 percent of all wholesaling employment in forty of the
largest metropolitan areas were found outside the central city.13
The prevailing trend over the past half-century has been a relative,
and often absolute, decline in central employment and a rapid growth of
jobs in suburban areas.'4 Theories that claim to explain the suburbaniza-
tion of urban populations, changes in the length of the journey to work,
and modifications of central and suburban densities without explicit
references to these changes in the distribution of employment must be
viewed with suspicion. Many of the past changes in urban structure,
which monocentric theories attribute to increases in incomes and to
declines in the real costs of transportation, may instead be the result of
changes in the spatial distribution of employment. Existing empirical
tests of the theories utterly fail to distinguish among these explanations.
Recognition of the polycentric nature of modern metropolitan areas
makes the arithmetic somewhat more difficult, but it does not change the
analytics of the household choice problem in any major way. It does,
however, considerably increase the predictive power and usefulness of
the theory. As in traditional theories, our theory recognizes that house-
holds incur transportation outlays in order to reside at a particular
location. Moreover, as in traditional theories, the transportation expen-
ditures that would be incurred at each possible residence location may
differ by household because of differences in the number of trips made to
actual or potential trip destinations, and because of differences in travel
costs per mile.
To compute the transportation costs associated with each residence
location for each household, it is necessary to make some fairly strong
simplifying assumptions about the demand for trips. Specifically, we
assume that all trips are made either to known and predetermined
destinations, or to ubiquitous and substitutable ones.'5 A second fairly
13John F. Kain, "The Distribution and MovementofJobs and Industry," in The
MetropolitanEnig,na, James Q. Wilson, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968),
p.27.
14Daniel Creamer (assisted by Walter B. Brown), Man.t(facturing Einploytnent by
Type of Location: An Examination of Recent Trends (New York: National Industrial
Conference Board, 1969); Leon M. Moses and Harold F. Williamson, "The Location of
Economic Activity in Cities," American Economic Review 57, no. 2 (May 1967): 2 11—22;
Raymond Vernon, The Changing.Econornic Function of the Central City (New York: Area
Development Committee, Committee for Economic Development, Jan. 1959).
'5Even these assumptions could be relaxed in the name of theoretical elegance, and
complications involving them could be incorporated into the theory. These complications
would add little to the present analysis, however. Although our assumptions are fairly
strong, they are much weaker than those employed in traditional theories, which generally
assume an inelastic demand for trips to the single center.28 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
strong assumption is that households place a monetary value on their
travel time. AmpI.e theoretical justification for this assumption is availa-
ble, and a fairly large number of empirical studies have obtained surpris-
ingly consistent quantitative estimates of the dollar-value urban house-
holds impute to their commuting time.'6 Rather than explore these
issues at this point, we shall simply assume that households place a
monetary value on their travel time and that they use these costs in
choosing housing bundles and residential locations.
The two assumptions: (1) that households have completely inelastic
demands for trips to known and invariant destinations, and (2) that they
place some monetary value on their travel time, enable us to compute
accessibility costs for each household for each bundle type and for each
residence location. These costs, which are used in determining the
demand for housing bundles and the choice of residential locations, are
part of gross prices.
Gross prices are the sum of three components: (1) the market price
for a given bundle at a given location, including spatial quasi rents; (2)
the out-of-pocket money transport costs associated with the given loca-
tion; and (3) the cost of time incurred by choosing that location. It is
clear that the gross prices of housing consumption may vary for different
bundles of housing, as well as for different residential locations.
It should be noted, moreover, that the gross prices of housing may
vary considerably for households with differing travel requirements. The
usefulness of the model is enhanced by the fact that most of the variation
in travel costs among alternative locations is attributable to a few kinds
of trips, particularly trips to and from work. The latter account for 40
percent of all trips originating or ending at residences; and because they
are longer on the' average than other kinds of urban trips, they comprise
an even larger percentage of miles of intraurban travel by American
households.17 Many of the remaining trips, such as shopping trips, are
made to highly ubiquitous locations.
'6Gary Becker,"ATheory of the Allocation of Time," Economic Journal 75, no. 299
(Sept. 1965):493—517; Leon N. Moses, "Income, Leisure, and Wage Pressure," Economic
Journal 72,no.286(June1962):320— 34;Bruce M. Johnson,"TravelTime and the Price of
Leisure," Western Economic Journal 4, no. 2(Spring1966):135—45;Michael E.Beesley,
"The Value of Time Spent in Travelling: Some New Evidence," Econornica 32, no. 126
(May 1965): 174—85; D. A. Quarmby, "Choice of Travel Made for the Journey to Work,"
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy1, no. 3 (Sept. 1967): 273—314; Reuben
Gronau, The Value of Time in Passenger Transportation: The De,nandfor Air (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Thomas E. Lisco, "The Value of Commuters'
Travel Time: A Study in Urban Transportation" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, June
1967).
17Thisestimate is based on origination data for thirty-eight metropolitan areas
reported in Robert E. Schmidt and M. Earl Campbell, Highway Traffic EstimationA Theory of Urban Housing Markets and Spatial Structure 29
It is probably not overly unrealistic to treat the costs of these
ubiquitous trips as invariant with location. The most important variation
in the component of travel costs by bundle type probably exists between
neighborhoods where car ownership is close to a necessity and those
where it is merely a convenience. Whether a consumer who chooses the
latter location also decides to buy a car will depend primarily on his trip
demands, and on whether his trip destinations—particularly, his work-
place—are well served by public transit.
The fact that the variation in gross prices for most households is
primarily attributable to work trips allows a highly important analytical
simplification of the theory, one which increases its usefulness and
permits a variety of empirical tests. If only work trips are included in the
definition of gross prices, the minimum gross price of each bundle will
depend solely on workplace location and the value of travel time. This
means that the consumption of housing bundles and locations should
vary systematically by workplace.
The principal sources of variation in gross prices among households
employed at the same workplace are caused by different travel demands
and differences in the value that households assign to their travel time.
The most important differences in travel demands probably arise from
differences in family labor-force participation and in the frequency of
social-recreational trips to urban centers. The largest sources of varia-
tion in the household valuation of travel time are probably differences in
wage levels or earnings and in the ease with which the worker can vary
his workweek. 18Familieswith two wage earners making daily work trips
to centers located in the same general part of the region would signifi-
cantly increase the travel-cost component of the gross prices. House-
holds with no employed members would lack the largest, or at least most
predictable, source of variation in gross prices. Though recognition of
these differences in household travel demands greatly increases the
difficulty of implementing the theory and applying it in an operational
way, its essential character is unaffected.
The minimum gross price of each bundle for each household serves
two functions in our revised theory. First, the gross prices of bundles are
important determinants of the choice of housing bundle. Second, once
the household has decided which bundle to consume, the gross prices
determine where it will reside. The way in which gross prices affect
(Saugatuck,Conn.: The Eno Foundation for Highway Traffic Control, 1956) Table 11-4..
Thestatistics for the remaining trip purposes are: (1)business,7 percent; (2) social-
recreation, 21 percent; (3) shopping, 12 percent; (4) school, 5percent;and (5) all others, 11
percent.
'8Moses, "Income, Leisure, and Wage Pressure."30 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
these decisions, and particularly the
easily be shown by simple graphical
SOMESIMPLE ANALYTICS
effect of workplace location, can
analysis.
The use of gross prices makes it relatively easy to examine the
effect that alternative workplace locations and variations in travel costs
have upon the type of housing consumed and its location. Some geomet-
ric examples are useful in illustrating the power of this simple theory of
individual housing consumers.'9
Figure 2-1 depicts gradients of bundle prices for a hypothetical
urban region comprised of many workplaces. The origin in Figure 2-1
refers to an employment centroid, at which, by coincidence, the prices
of all bundles are highest. The housing-bundle price gradients shown in
Figure 2-1 resemble the location rent gradients used in traditional
Dollars/nionth
'9This discussion draws liberally on a similar presentation in John F. Kain and
Gregory K. Ingram, "The NBER Model as a Theory of Urban Spatial Structure,"
in Urban and Social Economics in Market andPlanned Economies, Alan A. Brown, Joseph
A. Licari, and Egon Neuberger, eds. (New York: Praeger, 1974). Some results consistent
with these analytics may be found in Quigley, "Influence of Workplaces," and "Housing
Demand in the Short Run: An Analysis of Polytomous Choice," paper prepared for the
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Dollars/month
theories,in that they decline with distance from the employment cen-
troid.(In most traditional theories, this corresponds to the single
employment location.) It should be clearly understood that regular
shapes depicted for the housing-bundle price gradients are not required
by the theory and are used merely to simplify the diagrams. The frame-
work can accommodate metropolitan surfaces of bundle prices of any
shape or complexity.
The prices shown in Figure 2-1 are what might be termed net
housing prices. To obtain gross prices, the household's monthly travel
costs must be added to the net housing prices. Figure 2-2 graphs monthly
travel costs of two households employed at the employment centroid,
drawn on the assumption that journey-to-work costs are the only ele-
ment of monthly travel costs that vary with residence location, and that
household A has a higher travel cost per mile (hour) than household B.
This difference could arise if trip-makers in household A value their
travel time at a higher rate, or if members of household A make more
trips than members of household B. For example, household A might
have two members employed at the centroid and household B only one.
In Figure 2-3, we add the bundle prices and transport costs to obtain
gross price surfaces for households A and B. From Figure 2-3, it is
apparent: (1) that there is a minimum cost location for each household
type and each bundle, and (2) that within each bundle type, the house-




























2live closer to work. This does not mean, however, that household B will
in fact live further from work than household A. As is evident from
Figure 2-3, this conclusion will hold only if households A and B choose
the same housing bundle.
In Figures 2-4 and 2-5,weillustrate the gross-price computations for
household A and for a third household, C, which has the same travel
costs per mile as household A, but where the worker(s) is employed at
an outlying workplace, W, rather than at the employment centroid. The
curves shown in Figure 2-4 illustrate several important propositions: (1)
the gross price of each bundle type will differ for otherwise identical
households employed at different workplaces; (2) households A and C, if
they consume the same housing bundle (which may be unlikely), will live
at different residence locations and travel different distances to and from
work; (3) relative gross prices will differ for households A and C; indeed
the gross prices need not even have the same ordinal rankings.
The above analysis, simple though it may be, illustrates that a
number of important and quite specific conclusions and predicticins can
be obtained from our model if a few parameters can be specified even in
general terms. These parameters are: (1) preferences or demands of
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households with different sociodemographic characteristics for different
bundles; (2) the general shapes of bundle price surfaces within urban
regions; and (3) the variation in monthly travel costs by households with
differing socioeconomic and sociodemographic characteristics. If even
crude answers can be obtained for these questions (and we believe
reasonable answers can be provided), the theory of the individual hous-
ing consumer can provide useful, quite specific, and testable hypotheses
about the behavior of housing consumers.
Quigley's analysis of the Pittsburgh housing market employs gross
prices in precisely the way suggested by the preceding analysis. Using a
sample of 3,000 households in the Pittsburgh region1 which have recently
moved, Quigley computes the cost of work trips from each of 333
workplaces to each of 136 residential areas and infers the gross prices for
18 types of rental housing bundles in each of these residence zones.2°
Then he obtains minimum gross prices for each of the 18 types of rental
housing bundles for each household.2' These minimum gross prices
and their spatial locations varied for housing bundle (18 types), for em-
ployment location (333 discrete zones), and by income class (6 cate-
gories). When the gross prices were used in a series of econometrically
estimated demand equations, the demand for housing bundles was found
to be significantly responsive to changes in the prices of that bundle and of
possible substitutes.22
Quigley also investigated the second role of these gross prices in our
revised theory of urban spatial structure: their position as determinants
of residential location. His results indicated that more than 40 percent of
rental households and more than 50 percent of owner households




Recognitionof: (1) the importance of housing stocks, (2) accessibil-
ity to many workplaces, and (3) the role of goods not produced by
20This entire analysis was reproduced for several alternative values of commuter
time.
21The minimum gross price of each housing bundle was represented by the price
required for each household to purchase any one of the units in the cheapest 5percentof
the gross-price distribution facing it.
22Quigley, "Housing Demand."
23Quigley, "Residential Location."A Theory of Urban Housing Markets and Spatial Structure 35
competitive markets, provides insight into the dynamics of neighbor-
hood change.
Most neighborhood attributes are produced by the collective
actions of consumers through local governments, by the aggregation of
locational decisions by individual households, by the investment deci-
sions of housing suppliers, or. by the interaction of these several determi-
nants.24 This does not mean, however, that neighborhood characteristics
are immutable.
Rapid neighborhood change is common. Some neighborhoods are
improved in quality by means of stock transformations and housing
investment, while others are allowed to decline by undermaintenance.
Similarly, levels of income and sociodemographic composition often
change rapidly. Surprisingly little is known about these neighborhood
dynamics, and the role of market forces is particularly unclear. Before a
fully adequate theory of urban spatial structure can be worked out, a
better understanding of these aspects of neighborhood dynamics is
essential.
Although we cannot provide a unified theory of neighborhood
dynamics, we can identify some important ingredients for such a theory.
First, it is clear that the expectations of housing demanders and inves-
tors concerning future neighborhood characteristics are as important, if
not more important, than current conditions. Home buyers are likely to
be more strongly influenced by expectations than renters in choosing
housing bundles, inasmuch as the former are also housing investors and
have higher transactions and moving costs than the latter. Moreover,
home ownership is most attractive to those households who expect to
remain in the same residential area for several years and to households
who strongly value this kind of stability.
While a variety of considerations affect expectations concerning
residential neighborhoods, most households undoubtedly rely fairly
heavily on simple extrapolations of recent trends. This suggests that
analyses of housing demand should probably begin by projecting simple
trends and by using such measurements in defining bundles. The
amounts and types of new investment in each neighborhood may be the
best indicators of these changes, both because they are visible and
because they reflect the assessments of other owners and investors
concerning the future of the area. Both the physical appearance of the
24Thomas C. Schefling, "Models of Segregation" (RANDCorporationMemoran-
dum, RM-6014-RC, Santa Monica, California, May 1969); idem, "A Process of Residential
Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping" in Racial Discrimination in Economic Life, Anthony
H. Pascal, ed. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath & Co., 1972).36 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
neighborhood and what it suggests in terms of a pattern of neighborhood
improvement, stability, or disinvestment are likely to have important
effects on the views of housing consumers.
The sociodemographic structure may be an important factor in
understanding neighborhood dynamics and change. In many neighbor-
hoods, all or most structures were built within a few years of each other.
Moreover, there is often a predominant type or style of structure. Often,
these similar dwellings were first occupied at almost the same time by
new households of similar age, income, and family composition. As a
result, many neighborhoods were initially relatively uniform in terms of
housing and household characteristics. This suggests that changes in the
composition of resident populations by neighborhood may be quite
"lumpy" and might be analyzed better as a cascade than as a steady-
state process. Some neighborhoods, particularly owner-occupied ones,
may appear quite stable for long periods of time. Then, in response to
life-cycle influences, they may change completely within a few years as a
generation of residents die, dissolve their households, or change resi-
dences. Once the process has begun, it reinforces itself as those left
behind have less and less reason to remain. When this occurs, the
neighborhood can change character and socioeconomic composition
very rapidly.25
Similar socioeconomic composition is by no means the only kind of
homogeneity found in urban neighborhoods. Many such neighborhoods
are rather uniform in terms of the physical characteristics of the struc-
tures located there. These structural characteristics and neighborhood
arrangements may determine which kinds of stock transformations are
feasible or economic. If important differences exist in stocks of this
kind—defined either in terms of characteristics of individual structures
or neighborhood arrangements—these manifestations of housing-stock
heterogeneity will act as a strong magnet for certain types of investment
(or disinvestment) and will be an important force in creating particular
types of neighborhcods.
Assume, for example, that because of changes in the composition of
the urban labor force or in its aggregate distribution, a latent demand
develops for three-bedroom, high-quality housing bundles at a central
location. Assume further, that there are several neighborhoods now
devoted to the production of three-bedroom low-quality housing bun-
dles, but that the structures in one of these neighborhoods can be more
cheaply transformed into high-quality bundles than those found else-
where. These lower transformation costs will attract pioneers, who will
25Thomas C. Schelling, "Models of Segregation," American Economic Review 59,
no. 2 (May 1969): 169—85; idem, "Process of Residential Segregation."A Theory of Urban Housing Markets and Spatial Structure 37
begin to transform three-bedroom units from low-quality to high-quality
use. Once the neighborhood is well identified as the transitional neigh-
borhood, it is likely that part or even most of these savings will be
captured by the existing property owners.
A similar result would be obtained with even more certainty if some
characteristics of the neighborhood as a whole make it more suitable for
the production of the high-quality bundles, i.e., its overall density of
structures, the favorable layout of local streets, the presence of public
open space or similar amenities. Since it would be expensive for individ-
ual housing suppliers to provide such amenities in other neighborhoods,
the presence of these amenities can be an additional force in allocating
housing investment among neighborhoods. Greater attention to the
nature of these housing production relationships might improve our
ability to describe different neighborhoods and to predict neighborhood
change.
Local services and local accessibility considerations can similarly
affect the likely futures of various, otherwise identical neighborhoods.
The growth of high-income employment at a major subcenter will
increase prices in residential neighborhoods in the immediate vicinity,
will discourage many households from choosing these locations, and
will attract households who value their time highly. Prosperous young
singles and couples, older couples, and others with minimal demands for•
neighborhood services will typically predominate in the first wave of
new residents. As these households become more numerous, they will
begin to upgrade the neighborhood, and other types of households,
which are more concerned about neighborhood attributes, will follow.
Again, once the neighborhood becomes clearly identified as being on the
upswing, this will provide a strong impetus to further development in the
same direction.
SOMEKEY ASSUMPTIONS
Althoughwe believe that the revised theory outlined in this chapter
represents a more useful and more correct view of the housing market
than traditional theories, it does depend on several strong behavioral
assumptions of its own. It is appropriate to consider them now.
Perhaps the most crucial of these assumptions is what might be
termed the "workplace-dominance" assumption. We assume that intra-
metropolitan variations in gross prices (housing cost plus transportation
costs at the least-cost location for each housing bundle) result primarily
from differences in workplace location and from spatially distributed
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places are confronted with different location-rent—transportation-cost
tradeoffs for each housing type. These prices determine both the house-
hold's choice among housing types, which depends on itstastes,
incomes, and relative gross prices; and the household's residence loca-
tion, which is dictated by the least-cost location for consuming its
preferred housing type. However, in order for households to compute
workplace-specific housing costs,. they must have a predetermined
workplace. Therefore, this alternative theory of urban spatial structure
assumes that households decide their place of work before choosing the
type and location of their housing. Because of its critical role in our
theory, we must give serious consideration to the question of which way
the causation runs between job and residence choices. Traditional theo-
ries avoid this knotty theoretical problem altogether by assuming that
there is only one workplace.
The workplace-dominance assumption is hardly defensible on nar-
row theoretical grounds. Obviously, workers prefer some jobs to others
and wages may differ from one workplace to another. The authors of
traditional theories have pointed out that, in equilibrium, local workers
must obtain lower money wages than centrally employed workers in
order to compensate the centrally employed for the higher housing and!
or travel costs which they incur.26
These deficiencies of our revised theory can be quite easily cor-
rected if we are prepared to make it sufficiently general and to proceed to
a sufficiently high level of abstraction. The characteristics and money
wage of each job can be specified, and households can be depicted as
simultaneously choosing ajob (a workplace location and a money wage),
a housing type and residential location, a time spent in traveling, and all
other goods so as to maximize their utility. It is not difficult to specify
formally such a general utility-maximization problem and to describe the
general properties of the solution. Unfortunately, the resulting solutions
are so general as to provide little useful insight.
In our view, a more productive approach is to make the stronger
behavioral assumption that workplaces for each household are predeter-
mined. if this assumption can be empirically supported, it yields specific
conclusions about urban growth and development, and the motivating
philosophy behind it does not differ from that which led to the single-
workplace and equilibrium assumptions in traditional theories
of urban spatial structure. The assumption that workplaces are predeter-
mined is less restrictive than the single-workplace assumption of tradi-
tional theories.
Theoretical support for the proposition can be found in the notion
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that job choice and, hence, workplace location, depend upon particular
training or aptitude and are most important to the household's economic
well-being. Hence, particular job and work site choice predates residen-
tial-location choice. In addition, it can be shown that under many
circumstances, identical logical and empirical results would be obtained
if households reversed the process, i.e., if they had fixed residences and
chose workplace locations so as to maximize their real incomes (money
wage minus travel costs). Finally, empirical tests of the workplace-
dominance assumption and of the theory of residential location derived
from it provide considerable support for its validity.
Indirect empirical support for the workplace-dominance assumption
is of two kinds: (1) evidence on the effect of changes in workplace
location on household decisions to move; and (2) evidence on the effect
of workplace-specific housing costs on the types and location of housing
chosen by spending units.
Evidence of the first kind can be inferred from studies of household
moving behavior. Several such studies have attempted to examine the
effect ofjob changes on households' decisions to relocate. Most mobility
studies are virtually unanimous in the conclusion that intrametropolitan
changes in workplace locations have little or no effect on household
moving decisions. For example, Goldstein and Mayer conclude that
"intra-urban residential moves are not associated with changes in job
location."27 Rossi is more cautious but emphasizes the life-cycle aspects
of moving behavior to the virtual exclusion of employment location or
job changes.28 The near universality of agreement on the question is
illustrated by a 1968 review article by J. W. Simmons, who after a
careful review of studies of mover behavior states, "all studies reject job
location as an important reason for moving."29
The unanimity of these views is disturbing; if the conclusions are
correct, they undermine the workplace-dominance assumption. Of
course, it would be possible for households to employ the calculus
outlined above when house hunting initially, even if they do not move in
response to job changes. But, unless households adjust their residence
choices to significant changes in job location, the empirical and theoreti-
cal bases for the model presented above are seriously shaken. House-
holds change jobs frequently, and any initial explanatory power pro-
vided by the model would be weakened over time if the households then
Goldstein and K. Mayer, "Migration and the Journey-to-Work," Social Forces
42 (May 1964): 479.
28Peter Rossi, Why Fatnilies Move (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1955).
29J. W. Simmons, "Changing Residences in the City: A Review of Jntraurban Mo-
bility," GeographicReview58, no. 4 (Oct. 1968): 637.40 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
TABLE2-2




Characteristics AllMoves Within Tract Outside Tract
No change .111 .015 .096
Change withinzone .170 .037 .133
Change outsidezone .280 .027 .253
SOURCE: H.James Brown and John F. Kain, "Moving Behavior of San Francisco
Households" in"Supporting EmpiricalStudies" vol. 2 of "The NBER Urban Simula-
tion Model," John F. Kain, ed., processed (New York: National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1971), p. VI-22.
fail to respond to significant changes in job location by choosing a more
suitable residence location.
Careful examination of these studies of intrametropolitan mobility,
however, reveals that most have considered job changes almost as an
afterthought. As a result, the effects of job changes on residential
location are difficult, if not impossible, to isolate. In contrast, recent
NBER research by Brown and Kain, using more suitable data and
methodology, strongly supports the workplace-dominance assumption.
The employment and residence histories analyzed by Brown and Kain
indicate that significant intrametropolitan workplace changes do cause
households to change residential location.
Shown in Table 2-2 are mobility rates for San Francisco households
from the Brown and Kain study. These mobility rates are the propor-
tions of each of three types of households which moved during a single
year. The three are: (1) those which had no job change within an
eighteen-month period—twelve months prior td, and six months after,
July 1 of each year, (2) those which changed jobs within this period but
continued to be employed within the same workplace zone (these zones
are quite small; there are 290 in the San Francisco region), and (3) those
which changed jobs during the period and took a job in another work-
place zone. The data further distinguish between short (within the same
census tract) and long (outside of the census tract) residential moves.
The results indicate that job changes have little association with
short residential moves: the rates are uniformly low, ranging from a
moving probability of .02 for households with no job change to .04 for
households which changed jobs within the same workplace zone. The
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politan moving is, by comparison, striking. The probability of a house-
hold's moving from its census tract of residence is about .10 for house-
holds with no job change, about .13 for households who change to
nearby jobs, and .25 for households who take jobs in another workplace
zone.
Further evidence of the effect of job changes on household moving
behavior is provided by Table 2-3, which shows moving rates for house-
holds which changed jobs (both long- and short-distance job change) and
for those which did not change jobs. Mibility rates are presented by age
of head and tenure before the move, the two most important determin-
ants of moving identified by earlier studies. From Table 2-3, it appears
that job changes have a substantial effect on moving rates, even when
tenure and age of head are held constant. For example, the probability of
a young (less than thirty years of age) homeowner's moving in a particu-
lar year is nearly twice as large if he changes his job within the region as if
he does not, i.e., .140 versus .076.
Statistics on changes in travel time between home and work for
households with job changes provide further support for the hypothesis
that households do change their residences in response to job changes
that significantl.y alter their gross housing prices. Again, two groups can
be identified: (1) households which changed both their jobs and their
residences within the region, and (2) households which changed their
jobs but not their residences. For the first category, a comparison of
mean travel times between the old workplace and the old residence and
between the new workplace and the old residence indicates that, on the
average, changes in job location would have increased both the distance
and travel time between work and home if the households had not
TABLE2-3
Rates of Intrametropolitan Mobility by Tenure, Age, and Job
Change for San Francisco Households
Age
Renters Owners
No Job Job No Job Job
(Years) Change Change Change Change
30 .408 .526 .076 • .140
30—60 .232 .423 .050 .089
60+ .102 .228 .025 .041
SOURCE: H. James Brown and John F. Kain, "Moving Behavior of
San Francisco Households" in "Supporting Empirical Studies" vol. 2 of
"The NBER Urban Simulation Model," John F. Kain, ed., processed
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1971), p. VI-26.42 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
moved. For those who changed both their workplace and their resi-
dence, mean travel time between the old workplace and the old resi-
dence was 17.2 minutes; but between the new workplace and the old
residence, the travel time was nearly 7 minutes longer. After change in
residence location, however, the difference is less than 2 minutes.
Households which did not change their residences in response to a
workplace change lived, on the average, closer to their residences after
the job change than before.
Evidence of the effect of workplace-specific housing expense on
housing choices must also come primarily from NBER studies. How-
ever, the first systematic evidence that we are aware of was provided by
John F. Kain in a series of papers based on analysis of origin and
destination data from Detroit and Chicago.3° More rigorous tests of the
hypothesis have been provided by a series of NBER studies by Dresch
(Detroit), Straszheim (San Francisco), Brown-Kain (San Francisco-Oak-
land), Ingram (Pittsburgh), and Quigley (Pittsburgh).3' All of these stud-
ies find strong evidence that the location of the household's workplace
systematically affects the choice of residence site and housing type but
each represents housing expense differently and uses a somewhat differ-
ent representation of the housing bundle.
Straszheim, for example, who estimates demand functions for sev-
eral housing attributes, includes the minimum expected housing price
(estimated from the attributive price equations which we referred to
previously) 20 minutes from the workplace as the measure of workplace-
specific housing prices. He also includes the head of household's actual
commuting time in his demand functions.
Brown and Kain, because their sample is relatively small, use
dummy variables for six large workplace zones to represent intrametro-
politan variations in housing expense. In their formulation, discrete
housing types (bundles) are used to represent housing services, and
equations are estimated. relating the probability of choice among housing
types to household income, socioeconomic characteristics, and the
proxies for housing-price variation. Ingram and Dresch also represent
30John F. Kain, "A Contribution to the Urban Transportation Debate: An Econo-
metric Model of Urban Travel Behavior," Review of Economics and Statistics 46, no. 1
(Feb. 1964).
31A faii-ly complete presentation of the analyses by Brown and Kain and by Dresch is
presented in Chapter 8 and Appendix B of Gregory K. Ingram, John F. Kain, and J. Royce
Ginn, The Detroit Prototype of the NBER Urban Simulation Model (New York, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1972); the remaining analyses are presented in Gregory K.
Ingram, "A Simulation Model of a Metropolitan Housing Market" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard
University, 1971); Quigley, "Residential Location"; and Straszheim, Econometric Analy-
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housing services by discrete housing types in their individual analyses of
the demand for housing in Pittsburgh and Detroit.
As has been discussed previously, Quigley defines gross price
variables for individuals as the minimum total housing expenditure
(housing plus commutation costs) which must be incurred to consume
each of eighteen types of rental housing. The gross prices vary by
workplace, reflecting accessibility to the stock of each housing type, and
by income, reflecting the cost of commuting time. Quigley then includes
these relative prices in attribute demand equations for rental units in
Pittsburgh. The results suggest that demand for housing attributes is
responsive to the intrametropolitan price variation resulting from work-
place differences and their effects upon the gross price of housing
consumption.
A second key behavioral assumption in our revised theory of urban
spatial structure is that households, however implicitly, value their
travel time at some dollar amount. This hourly travel-time cost is used
by the households in computing their workplace-specific housing
expenses. This assumption is not controversial; an extensive literature
provides both theoretical and empirical justification.32 As is true of the
workplace-dominance assumption, the assumption of predetermined
value of travel time is a considerable simplification.
It is convenient to be able to speak of a fixed and predetermined unit
value of travel time, but the underlying behavioral assumption needed is
much weaker: all that is required is that households place some value on
travel time and have some disutility of travel at all workplaces.
SUMMARY
Thediscussion presented in this chapter provides an alternative,
more general, and, we believe, more useful view of urban housing
markets. The revised theory which results from this alternative perspec-
tive has much in common with traditional theories of residential loca-
tion. In particular, it starts with the assumption that a household chooses
that quantity of housing services and that location which maximize its
real income. One important difference between the revised and tradi-
tional theories is the former's conception of housing as a bundle of
heterogeneous attributes, rather than as a homogeneous good. This
32Becker, "Theory of Allocation"; Moses, "Income, Leisure, and Wage Pressure";
Johnson, "Travel Time"; Beesley, "Value of Time"; Quarmby, "Choice of Travel";
Gronau, Value of Ti,ne in Passenger Transportation; Lisco, "Value of Commuters'
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distinction becomes important as soon as the possibility of significant
departures from long-run equilibrium is acknowledged. In our revised
theory, households base their decisions about which housing bundles to
consume and where to reside on the combined housing and transport
costs they would incur in consuming each housing bundle at its least-cost
location to them. These combined costs, or gross prices, are the
expected sum of outlays for the journey to work—including both money
and time expenditures—and housing expenditures.
In some respects, this emphasis on tradeoffs between housing and
commuting costs corresponds quite closely to traditional theories of
residential location. Important differences arise, however, from our
emphasis on the multiple perspectives of the housing market provided
by multiple workplace locations and the heterogeneous nature of the
housing stock. Each household employed at each workplace estimates
the expected residential expenditure required to consume a particular
hOusing bundle. Traditional theories of location assume that the prices of
al.l housing inputs except land are the same everywhere in the urban
area. Therefore, these theories obtain a single housing price gradient.
Our alternative view of the housing market, which emphasizes the
importance of stocks and the nonmarket production of many housing
attributes, suggests, however, that many housing attributes are rela-
tively fixed and earn quasi rents. Therefore, we expect the prices of
housing attributes or bundles to exhibit irregular and quite complex
patterns of spatial variation.
Housing capital is exceedingly durable, and many types of struc-
tures are all but impossible to transform. The market prices of these
structures can deviate substantially from their cost of production and
from one part of an urban area to another. Other housing attributes, such
as police protection, garbage collection, and public schools are produced
by an interaction between local decision-makers and neighborhood pop-
ulations. Still others, such as the racial and socioeconomic characteris-
tics of neighborhoods, are produced by the collective location decisions
of individual households. A consequence of housing stock durability and
the nonmarket provision of certain attributes is that there are generally
different price surfaces for the various housing attributes or bundles.
Traditional theories, because they consider only long-run equilib-
rium solutions, provide no information about the process of stock adjust-
ment or the time path of adjustment. This failure to consider dynamic
adjustment mechanisms explicitly is a general weakness of economic
theory and analysis. However, because capital stocks are especially
important for urban housing markets, the weakness is particularly seri-
ous in the analysis of urban development.
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demolished and replaced by new structures. Furthermore, these stocks
have a powerful effect both on the types of new investment and on its
location. New construction is generally concentrated on those types of
housing services that are not easily or cheaply produced from the
existing stock of residential capital. Except where there are compelling
locational advantages, new construction occurs on vacant land—most of
which is found at the periphery of the built-up area. The result is that the
spatial distribution of housing capital of different types depends on the
timing of development and differs quite substantially from that which
would occur if the city were built de novo each year, or if the full
adjustment of the capital stock to changes in supply or demand condi-
tions, as implied by the long-run equilibrium state, were observed;33
The empirical analyses presented in Chapters 5 through 10 repre-
sent a serious but modest attempt to address several of the issues raised
by this alternative perspective on urban housing markets. Throughout
the remaining chapters, we describe and quantify housing as a collection
of particular residential attributes and analyze households' demand for
housing attributes and the structure of housing prices in a single market
which is not characterized by long-run equilibrium. However, our
empirical analysis does not address the multiplicity of workplaces
directly. This omission arises from the limited geographic coverage
within the single metropolitan area implied by our sample.
APPENDIXTO CHAPTER 2:
THE EXISTENCE OF QUASI RENTS FOR HOUSING
ATTRIBUTES
Thisappendix amplifies the discussion of spatial quasi rents pre-
sented in Chapter 2. Specifically, it provides a somewhat more rigorous
demonstration of the simple proposition that when the housing stock is
durable and heterogeneous, distinct surfaces of spatial quasi rents for
individual housing attributes (or bundles of housing attributes) will
typically exist, and these spatial quasi rents may persist for long periods
of time.
To illustrate this important conclusion, we present a simple hous-
ing-market model which incorporates two possible residence locations
("city" and "suburb"), two possible workplaces ("city" and "sub-
urb"), and two housing bundles ("high quality" and "low quality"). We
assume moreover that: (1) housing capital is specific and can be used. to
33David Harrison, Jr. and John F. Kain, "Cumulative Urban Growth and Urban
Density Functions," Journal of Urban Economics 1, no. 1 (Jan. 1974):61—99.46 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
produce only one type of housing output, in our example, either high-
quality or low-quality bundles; (2) it is possible to transform one kind of
specific housing capital to another, but these transformations are rela-
tively expensive; and (3) the housing capital has an infinite life and
continues to produce a given level of housing output without any annual
outlays.
The first two assumptions are fundamental to the general point that
we are trying to illustrate. The third merely simplifies the analytics. Its
relaxation would permit the "equilibrium" quasi rents indicated by the
examples to erode over time. Obviously, the assumption that the specific
housing-capital stocks have infinite lives does not conform to reality.
However, it probably does less violence to reality than the opposite
assumption of a full and instantaneous adjustment in specific and heter-
ogeneous stocks of residential and nonresidential capital.
Using these three assumptions, itis possible to show that an
increase in demand for one housing type can lead to several "equilib-
rium" price ratios. Moreover, generalization of the example to a larger
number of residences and workplaces indicates that there could, in
principle, exist a large number of "equilibrium" price ratios, if equilib-
rium is defined as a situation where no housing supplier has an incentive
to convert units between submarkets and no household has an incentive
to relocate.
The examples used assume that allindividuals have identical
incomes and preferences. Variations in incomes and preferences would
produce still more stable "equilibrium" price ratios. The model assumes
that the central neighborhoods are completely built up as a result of
historical patterns of urban development. This is the case in American
cities which, in general, have developed around a dominant center
where most employment was located. During the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, both residential and nonresidential development
occurred in a more-or-less regular fashion around this dominant center.
The concentration of employment in central locations in the early
periods insured that the prices of all housing bundles were higher in
central than in suburban areas. Location rent differentials less than or
equal to the savings in transportation costs for those residing in central
locations could exist between the two localities.
Changes in production and transportation technology modified the
location of employment, but the existing stock of residential capital was
geographically fixed. Thus, due to substantial declines in central-area
employment and to the growth of suburban employment, it is no longer
possible to assert with certainty that the prices (quasi rents) of all
housing bundles are higher in central than in suburban locations. In fact,
if the difference in supply prices exceeds the difference in transportA Theory of Urban Housing Markets and Spatial Structure 47
costs, a market price differential may persist without causing households
to move or housing suppliers to transform the stock.
Two simple examples illustrate these propositions. In the first,
transformation costs for the specific housing capital equal the long-run
equilibrium price differentials for high- and low-quality bundles. This
transformation-cost assumption produces price ratios identical to those
obtained in traditional, i.e., long-run equilibrium, theories. In the sec-
ond, the cost of transforming specific initial capital stocks of one kind to
another kind exceeds the initial differences in production cost. This
assumption produces a variety of price ratios.
Case 1:
Suppose there are n city and m suburban workers with identical
demand curves for high (H) and low (L) quality bundles. Travel cost
between the city and suburbs is d dollars. The prices of H bundles and L
bundles in the city are and PLC. The prices in the suburbs are
and
If there are N residences in the city and n > N, some city workers
will be forced to live in the suburbs; equilibrium requires that each city
worker be just as well off in either location. If city workers inhabit both
types of housing at both locations, the relationship between city and
suburban prices must be
(1) PHc=PHs-F-d
(2) PLc=PLS+d
Assume, for example, that L bundles can be produced in the
suburbs for 10 and H bundles can be produced for 20. Assume further
that transport costs are 5 and that L bundles can be transformed to H
bundles for 10 at either location, and from H bundles to L bundles for
—10 at either location. The costs of transformation are assumed equal to
the difference in original production or supply costs.
In this case, the supply and demand relationships for city and
suburban properties are shown in Figures 2-6a and 2-6b, respectively.
The vertical axis measures the ratio of H to L bundle prices at either
location; the percent of housing units that are of high quality in each
zone is shown on the horizontal axis. A change in demand for H bundles
(due, for example, to rise in income) from D1 to D2 will change the
percentage of units of high quality at either location. In the city, housing
units wil1 be converted from L to H bundles. In the suburbs either new
construction or conversion will take place. The relative price relation-




Supply and DemandRelationships for City Properties if Transport Costs
Equal 5 and Transformation Costs Equal 10
Allm suburban workers will live in the suburbs. The city workers
living in the suburbs will pay PHC —dandPLC —d, respectively,forff and
L bundles, and will be indifferent to location. Case 1 thus provides the
long-run equilibrium view of the housing market; in Case 2, weconsider
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Case 2:
In Case 2, we assume that, once housing is in place at
location, it requires demolition and replacement to modify it.
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either
High- and low-quality bundles can still be produced in the suburbs
atPHS =20andPLS =10,respectively. However, we assume thatthe cost
of transforming L bundles to H bundles and H bundles to L





PLC =PHC+ 10 + 2
bundles
Both markets are initially in equilibrium, and thesupply and
demand relationships are those depicted in Figures 2-7a and 2-7b.
The lowest possible price that L bundles in the city could sell for is
5+. If their price fell to 5 or less, suburban workers would move to the
city. At a price greater than 5, the ëost of producing H bundles in the
city would exceed 27. However, the selling price of H bundles in the city
could not rise above 25; otherwise city workers buying H bundles would
not be willing to live in the city.
In the city, where no vacant land exists, H and L bundles can only
be produced by converting existing units. In the suburbs, either new
construction or conversion is possible.
Similarly, the price of H bundles in the city could not fall below 15;
FIGURE2-7a
Supply and Demand Relationships for City Properties if Transformation









Supply and Demand Relationships for Surburban Properties if Transforma-
tion Costs Differ for High- and Low-Quality Bundles
ifthey sold for a lower price, suburban workers would move to the city.
If the price of H bundles in the city was 15 or more, the cost of
producing L bundles in the city would be equal to or more than 27.
However, the price of L bundles in the city cannot rise above 15;
otherwise city workers buying L bundles would not be willing to live in
the city.




In this simple case, where all workers have identical tastes and
incomes, only three relative prices are possible: 15/15, 25/15 (the long-
run equilibrium price ratio), and 25/5.
Figures 2-8a and 2-8b illustrate the possible equilibrium relative
prices associated with an increase in demand for H bundles. In the city,
where there is no vacant land, the supply curve is perfectly inelastic for
relative prices within the range 15/27 to 27/5, reflecting the costs of
converting housing bundles. In the suburbs, where new construction is
possible, the supply curve is elastic.
If the demand for H bundles increases from D1 to D2 on the
diagrams, the relative price of L bundles in the city may decline. If the
price of L bundles declines below 15, all of the city workers buying L
bundles in the suburbs would compete for the L bundles in the city. If,
after the change in the demand curves, the switch of all those city
workers buying L bundles in the suburbs to the purchase of L bundles in
the city were not enough to fill the existing number of available L units inA Theory of Urban Housing Markets and Spatial Structure 51
FIGURE 2-8a
Supply and Demand Relationships for City Properties Given Two Work-
places and Two Kinds of Housing
thecity, the price of L bundles in the city would fall to 5, the level
necessary to attract suburban workers who consume L bundles to city
properties. The price would not fall below 5, however; because at this
price, city L bundles would be just as attractive as suburban L bundles
tothosesuburban workers who consume L bundles.
If the price of L bundles in the city fell below 15, indicating that all
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bundles in the city could not fall below 25. A price for H bundles below
25 would indicate that all city workers were able to locate in the city.
Since n > N, this outcome is impossible.
A decline in the price of H bundles would shift the city demand
curve for H bundles further to D3 and would shift the suburban demand
curve for H bundles back to D3. The result would be an "equilibrium"
price ratio of 25/5 in the city and 20/10 in the suburbs.
if, on the other hand, the decline in demand for L bundles in the city
was not large enough to create more L bundles in the city than the
number of city workers consuming them, the price of L bundles in the
city would remain at 15. Since the price of H bundles cannot exceed 25
in the city and no suburban workers consume L bundles in the city, the
relative price ratio in the city cannot change.
A price ratio of 25115 would shift the demand curves in Figures 2-8a
and 2-8b to D4. The new demand curve for city properties will be
identical to the original, and all the increase in demand will be accommo-
dated by construction of H bundles in the suburbs. The result would be
"equilibrium" price ratios of 25/15 in the city and 20/10 in the suburbs.
These shifts in the demand curves, from D2 to D3 or from D2 to D4 in
Figures 2-8a and 2-8b arise because workers at either location compare
the prices of consuming each type of housing at each location and switch'
the location for consuming their preferred type of housing in response to
price changes.
The mechanism which shifts the demand curves can be illustrated
simply in the case of two workplaces and two kinds of housing. If
individuals have identical preferences, a linear demand curve for the n
workers employed in the city may be expressed as
() —
mm(PHC, PHS + d)
mm(PLC,+ d)
For the m suburban workers:
mm (PHS PHC + d) P(H)=a+bmm (Pu, + d)
P(H) is the individual's probability of consuming H bundles (regardless
of location) and a and b are parameters.
Table 2-4 illustrates the demands of city and suburban workers, for
H and L bundles in the city (HC and LC) and for H and L bundles in the
suburbs (HS and LS) at four relative prices. 0 indicates no demand;"—"
indicates indifference in location at city or suburbs for consumption of
this type of housing; 1 indicates all demands for this type of housing will
be expressed at this location.
Because switching can occur in the neighborhood of these priceA Theory of Urban Housing Markets and Spatial Structure 53
TABLE2-4
Demands of City and Suburban Workers for High-Quality and Low-Quality




























































ratios, and workers at a given location will switch the location for
consuming their preferred housing bundles, there are in fact different
market demand curves associated with these price ratios. For example,
the market demand curves for high-quality city units associated with the








%HCis the percent of all city housing comprised of high-quality
bundles.
Similarly, the market demand curves for high-quality suburban
bundles associated with relative prices A, B, and C are:
Price ratio A




r r PHs11 (11)%HS=n[a+b
j— 2 2
where %HS is the percent of all suburban housing comprised of high-
quality bundles.
Starting from the equilibrium relative-price relationship A (where
PHC = + d and = + d), suppose that there is an identical
increase in everyone's demand for H bundles as a result of rising
incomes. Let a increase byThedemand for HC increases by n&2
and the demand for HS increases by n&2 + m. If the supply curve in
the city is .highly inelastic (transformation costs are large), the price
ratio in the city must rise. However, the price of HG, cannot
rise since there are city workers living in H bundles in the suburbs
and we have just postulated that demand for H bundles has risen.
If the corresponding decline in demand for L bundles associated
withis large enough so that all city workers who now demand L
bundles can live in the city and there is at least 1 vacant unit, the price of
L bundles in the city will decline from+ d to —dand the price
ratio in the city will increase.
TI the decline in demand for L bundles associated withis not large
enough to create an excess supply of L bundles in the city relative to the
demand by city workers for L bundles, the price ratio will remain
unchanged and all the additional demand will be channeled to the
suburbs.
With regard to the four possible outcomes shown in Table 2-4:
1. Price ratio D is clearly impossible in N < n, that is, by the
statement of the problem (there are not enough city houses so that all
city workers may live there).
2. The price ratios (and market demand curves) A (and equations 6
and 9), B (and equations 7 and 10) or C (and equations 8 and 11) may be
stable "equilibrium" price relationships. If a change in demand pro-
duces an excess supply of one kind of city unit relative to the new
number of city demanders, the price ratio will change. The price ratio
may be shifted from A (the long-run equilibrium price relationship) to C
if there is an increase in demand for H the price ratio may be
shifted from A to B if there is an increase in demand for L bundles. If the
change in demand is not sufficient to produce this excess supply, the
price will not change in the city, the additional demand will be satisfied
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The analyses presented in Case 2 can easily be generalized to
consider additional workplaces and residences. For example, if there
are three zones, two of which have excess workers, an increase in
price demand for H bundles can lead to two stable "equilibrium" price
ratios besides the long-run equilibrium prices (one stable price ratio if the
decrease in demand for L bundles creates an excess supply of L bundles
relative to the number working in the same zone demanding L bundles,
and one additional stable price ratio if the decrease creates an excess
supply large enough to accommodate the second zone's demand). The
generalization to additional housing types changes none of the foregoing
analysis. Switching among submarkets and locations insures that the
same type of relative-price relationships will exist.
If individuals are not assumed to have the same incomes and
preferences, the possibilities of stable relative prices which differ from
long-run supply prices are more numerous. In the simple example with
two workplaces and housing types, all individuals with the same work-
place will not switch between suburban and city locations at the same
relative price. This indicates that in response to an increase in demand
for H bundles, a stable equilibrium may exist somewhere in the interval
between relative price A (PHS + dIPLS +d) and C (P+dIPLS —d),
and the equilibrium price of L in the city, PLC, will merely be bounded